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organizational adaptations. Especially
useful are the four “context” tables, one
for each decade starting with the 1970s,
that list by year who was presiding as
CNO, along with the relevant Navy capstone documents, the Navy’s “total
[that is, financial] obligation authority,” total number of ships in the fleet,
new ships arriving in the fleet, active
personnel, and new capabilities introduced. Juxtaposed against the numerous organizational charts in the report,
these context tables help in understanding how each CNO has reorganized, not
only responding to the variety of exogenous forces but also to implement his
own vision for the future of the Navy.
By recounting in detail the reorganization that the current CNO, Admiral
Gary Roughead, has made to the staff,
readers can see for themselves the most
consequential changes enacted and, by
extension, the most consequential issues facing the Navy today, in
Roughead’s view.
Swartz and Markowitz identify two
major changes made by Admiral
Roughead. First is the consolidation of
the Intelligence (N2) and the Communications Networks (N6) directorates
into a newly created Directorate for Information Dominance (N2/6), a move
that underscores the critical importance
of a holistic approach to communications and intelligence, including the
emerging preeminence of cyber and
electronic warfare. The future impact of
this consolidation could be quite large,
given the issues at stake.
Second, equally as revealing has been
the morphing of the staff’s internal
think tank, “Deep Blue,” into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) cell to
meet the challenges of the recent QDR,
and finally into the Naval Warfare
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Integration Group (00X), in late 2009.
One function of 00X will be, acting as a
“special assistants” group, to provide
the CNO with direct assessments of
Navy programs and systems. Plainly,
this CNO sees a critical need to be
armed with as much information and
analysis as possible to address the tremendous budgetary pressures affecting
the Navy, which pose a special challenge to the future health of the naval
force, a challenge requiring particular
attention and focus.
Where the study itself is admittedly thin
is in its narratives—which might have
been richer—of the colorful personalities, nuanced forces, and institutional
rivalries that sculpted the shape of the
OPNAV staff during a very dynamic period. Those wanting an Allisonian-like
examination of the organizational, political, and personal dynamics shaping
this change will have to wait for what
Swartz and Markowitz recommend as
next steps: an expansion of the study to
personalities, relationships, and indepth answers to the “why” question.
Until then, scholars of U.S. Navy history and organizational studies can be
content with this well researched, accurate, and informative report.
THOMAS CULORA, Chairman, Warfare Analysis
and Research Department
Naval War College

Drezner, Daniel W., ed. Avoiding Trivia: The Role
of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2009. 230pp. $24.95

Students of American national security
policy, particularly those without the
benefit of firsthand policy-making
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experience, frequently under- or overestimate the difficulty of formulating
and implementing strategy in the U.S.
government. As a result, observers tend
either to portray senior policy makers
as dolts or incompetents or to engage in
a sort of strategic nihilism holding that
it is impossible to develop sound strategy in this day and age.
Daniel Drezner’s informative collection
Avoiding Trivia deserves to be read by
scholars of both varieties. It contains essays that were commissioned for a 2008
conference held at the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the State Department’s policy
planning office, an organization best
known for its first director, George
Kennan, and his successor, Paul H.
Nitze. The contributors are largely
scholar-practitioners, including several
of my own counterparts during my service as deputy assistant secretary of
defense during the George W. Bush
administration.
The first section of the book includes
contributions by Richard Haass, David
Gordon and Daniel Twining, and
Jeffrey Legro, who discuss the strategic
environment and the challenges it poses
for policy planning in the United States.
Bruce Jentleson, Aaron Friedberg, and
Peter Feaver and William Inboden are
found in the second section, discussing
how strategic planning can best be implemented in the executive branch. The
latter chapter, describing the resurrection of the strategic planning function
at the National Security Council during
the George W. Bush administration, is
particularly insightful.
Essays by Amy Zegart, Thomas Wright,
Andrew Erdmann, and Steven Krasner

cover the opportunities and limitations
for strategic planning in the final
section.
This work collectively emphasizes the
imperative of strategic planning as well
as why it is an art whose practice is difficult. It deserves the attention of scholars and practitioners alike.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Naval War College

Nielson, Suzanne C., and Don M. Snider, eds.
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier
and the State in a New Era. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 2009. 409pp. $34.95

Samuel J. Huntington published his
seminal work on American civilmilitary relations, The Soldier and the
State, in 1957. His analysis, reflective of
the U.S. experience in World War II,
Korea, and the Cold War, was designed
to “maximize military security at the
least sacrifice to other social values.” It
has provided a theoretical and practical
guide to civil-military relations for
more than fifty years. However, in this
“new era” of the first decade of the
twenty-first century, many have challenged the continued relevance of Huntington’s theories.
In 2007, editors Suzanne Nielson and
Don Snider assembled an impressive interdisciplinary group of scholars to analyze Huntington’s theories in light of
the American experience since 1957.
Fifteen researchers produced a dozen
essays addressing Huntington’s main
theoretical contributions: the functional and societal imperatives that
shape the nature of the military organization, the subjective and objective patterns of civilian control of the military,

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/13

NWCR_Winter2011.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Winter2011\NWCR_Winter2011.vp
Friday, December 03, 2010 10:20:54 AM

2

